Perhaps one of the best books I came upon recently was written with the inside help by a Conservative figure that served some time ago in the administration of current President G. W Bush. The book I am referring to is, “The Price of Loyalty: George W. Bush, the White House, and the Education of Paul O’Neill,” by former Wall Street Journal reporter Ron Suskind. Paul 0’Neill’s   inside source  information was helpful to Suskind  as like any authentic journalist would do – tried to record and investigate the actions of our power brokers leading up to and executing the biggest war in the history of any country. The book attempted to give some insight into the working of the inner circle and decision makers in the administration. It showed how important policy decisions were made, and the competing forces interplay to determined merits or not of complex issues that faced the country. In it we get a glimpse at leadership, loyalty and decision making under the microscope. This economic guru was fired after many disagreements with his boss in December 2002 after serving nearly two years in Bush’s Cabinet. It   was claimed that the act was due to differences he had with the president’s tax cuts.  One senses that this respected economist and Belt Parkway/ Washington Insider was not too enamored by his commander in chief and leader of the free world – at least by the end of his tenure.

      It was due to this book that I pounced upon a very useful expression that I then stored away for a later period. It was call ‘incencious amplification.’ In short, it means having advisers who don’t disagree with you. It can generally be linked to “A condition in warfare where one only listens to those who are already in lock-step agreement, reinforcing set beliefs and creating a situation ripe for miscalculation” A more common description might be that of group-think that was so aptly described byIrvin Janis in his 1972 book, Victims of Groupthink: A Psychology Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and Fiascoes. In it he gave some insights about the shenanigans that might have occurred in the power chambers when contemplating actions on the Kennedy’s Bay of Pigs fiasco and much discussed Vietnam debacles.  Groups experiencing -groupthink do not consider all alternatives and they desire unanimity at the expense of quality decisions.”[1]

      Not many American President’s have the honor of taking their country to war. Since the end of the Cold- War and all three Presidents and Commander in Chiefs was able to do so. The list includes George  H Bush, Bill Clinton, and now George .W Bush. It is a big decision that requires much planning and assessments. In the end it is always a solitary decision. Different Presidents bring diverse level of expertise to the office. Irrespective, all need sound unbiased and well thought advice. O’Neill also said in the book that President Bush “was like a blind man in a roomful of deaf people” during Cabinet meetings.  Suskind said O’Neill and other White House insiders gave him documents showing that in early 2001 the administration was already considering the use of force to oust Saddam, as well as planning for the aftermath. What the author is alluding to is a leader that knows exactly what he wants to do and simply surround himself with the people that can enable him. Truman and the atomic bomb, as opposed to JFK and the Bay of Pigs or  FDR belated decision to go to war with Germany.

   There are those who are lulled into believing that this is not too smart a President. Many others with an acute sense of the powerful might very well know otherwise. He might not necessarily be concerned with the minute details of an issue but nevertheless can get whatever he sets his mind on to the same extent as any one of his more intelligent predecessors. The trick has always been to surround oneself with committed team players, give them a task and never take no for an answer. Perhaps its one of those areas of focus at Harvard 101 MBA school thinking.

As a member of the business world O Neal preferred decisions that are made after careful analysis of the facts while equal weight are made of the pros and cons of action. He therefore might have found George Bush senior more to his liking.  Take notice of the case in the decision to put Desert Storm in place in 1990 after Saddam’s Kuwaitis invasion. The decision to stop short of invading Iraq itself was also a calculating one for obvious reasons. O’Neill looked negatively at what he perceived as yes men or women and leaders that make a decision and find supporters irrespective of consequences.

Hitler foolhardy act of trying to conquer Russia against all the overwhelming odds ,  Napoleon’s overambitious acts in  his early European adventures, Saddam  destructive maneuvers in the Middle East against  Iran, Kuwait , and the entire international community  led by the US ,  the ailing Leonid Brezhnev’s decision to invade Afghanistan  in 1979, and Serbian strongman Slobodan Milosevic,   are prime examples of acts devoid of serious  thoughts  as to  consequences.  It is for history to judge what is right in these situations based on the outcomes. In the case of Iraq, the script is still been written.  I do have a small quote that I used to assess the merits of past actions. I was able to gather same from a former high school teacher. I t stated that “something is good if it works.”